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Abstract
As has been widely discussed, the GSM mobile telephony system only offers
unilateral authentication of the mobile phone to the network; this limitation
permits a range of attacks. While adding support for mutual authentication
would be highly beneficial, changing the way GSM serving networks operate
is not practical. This paper proposes a novel modification to the relationship
between a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and its home network which
allows mutual authentication without changing any of the existing mobile
infrastructure, including the phones; the only necessary changes are to the
authentication centres and the SIMs. This enhancement, which could be
deployed piecemeal in a completely transparent way, not only addresses a
number of serious vulnerabilities in GSM but is also the first proposal for
enhancing GSM authentication that possesses such transparency properties.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a way of adding network-to-phone authentication to the
GSM mobile phone system, in a way that is completely transparent to the
existing network infrastructure. Currently, GSM only supports authentica-
tion of the phone to the network, leaving the system open to a wide range of
threats (see, for example, [20]). Despite the introduction and deployment of
3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) mobile phone systems, which rectify the GSM
problem by providing mutual authentication between phone and network,
GSM remains of huge practical importance worldwide and is not likely to be
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replaced for many decades to come. As a result, finding ways of improving
the security offered by GSM, without the need for changes to the deployed
phones and access networks, is clearly of great practical significance. This
observation motivates the work described in this paper.
It is somewhat counterintuitive to propose that authentication of the net-
work to the phone can be achieved without modifying the way in which the
existing network and phones operate. This apparently paradoxical result is
achieved by using a technique we refer to as RAND hijacking. This involves
using the RAND value, which serves as a nonce in the existing unilateral
authentication protocol and is sent from the network to the phone, to con-
tain data which enables the recipient SIM to verify its origin and freshness.
That is, the RAND is hijacked to act as a communications channel between
a home network and a SIM.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Key facts about the
GSM network, including details of the operation of the GSM authentication
and key establishment (AKA) protocol, are given in section 2. This is fol-
lowed in section 3 by an introduction to the notion of RAND hijacking. In
section 4, the novel enhanced version of the GSM authentication scheme is
described, and section 5 describes how the SIM can use the results of the
network authentication to affect UE behaviour. An analysis of the novel
system is provided in section 6. The relationship of the proposed scheme to
the prior art is discussed in section 7, and the paper concludes in section 8.
2 GSM
2.1 Terminology
We start by providing a brief overview of key terminology for mobile systems.
We focus in particular on the GSM network, but much of the description
applies in slightly modified form to 3G and 4G networks. A more detailed
description of GSM security features can, for example, be found in Pagliusi
[21].
A complete mobile phone is referred to as a user equipment (UE), where the
term encapsulates not only the mobile equipment (ME), i.e. the phone, but
also the subscriber identity module (SIM) within it, where the SIM takes
the form of a cut-down smart card. The SIM embodies the relationship
between the human user and the issuing home network, including the In-
ternational Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), the telephone number of the
UE, and other user (subscriber) data, together with a secret key shared with
the issuing network which forms the basis for all the air interface security
features.
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To attach to a mobile network, a UE connects via its radio interface to a
radio tower. Several radio towers are controlled by a single radio network
controller (RNC) which is connected to one mobile switching center/visitor
location register (MSC/VLR). The MSC/VLR is responsible for controlling
call setup and routing. Each MSC/VLR is also connected to the carrier net-
work’s home location register (HLR) where corresponding subscriber details
can be found. The HLR is associated with an authentication center (AuC)
that stores cryptographic credentials required for communicating with the
SIM; specifically, the AuC shares a unique secret key Ki with each SIM
issued by the network to which it belongs. The RNC and the MSC/VLR
are part of the visiting/serving network whereas the HLR and the AuC are
the home network component.
2.2 GSM authentication protocol
To prevent unauthorised mobile devices gaining access to network service,
GSM incorporates an authentication procedure which enables the network
to verify that the SIM in a UE is genuine. The authentication procedure
operates as follows. Further details can be found in technical specifications
GSM 03.20 [9] and GSM 04.08 [11].
1. The UE visits a network, and is initially identified using its IMSI.
2. The visited network identifies the UE’s home network from the sup-
plied IMSI, and contacts the home network for authentication infor-
mation.
3. The home network’s AuC generates one or more authentication triples
(RAND, XRES, Kc), and sends them to the visited network, where
RAND is a 128-bit random ‘challenge’ value, XRES is the 64-bit ‘ex-
pected response’, and Kc is a 64-bit short-term session key to be used
to encrypt data sent across the air interface between the UE and the
network.
4. The visited network sends RAND to the UE as an authentication
challenge.
5. The ME receives the RAND, and passes it to the SIM.
6. The SIM computes SRES = A3Ki(RAND) and Kc = A8Ki(RAND),
where A3 and A8 are network-specific cryptographic functions; A3 is a
MAC function and A8 is a key derivation function. Note that precisely
the same computation was performed by the AuC in step 3 to generate
XRES and Kc.
7. The SIM passes SRES and Kc to the ME.
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8. The ME keeps the session key Kc for use in data encryption, and
forwards SRES to the serving network.
9. The serving network compares SRES with XRES ; if they are the same
the UE is deemed authenticated, and Kc can now be used for traffic
encryption using any of the standardised algorithms (i.e. one of A5/1,
A5/2 and A5/3), as selected by the serving network.
2.3 Vulnerabilities
The GSM AKA protocol clearly only provides one-way authentication. As
widely documented (see, for example, [20]), this permits a ‘false’ base station
to impersonate a genuine network and interact with a UE. This in turn
gives rise to a range of security weaknesses. We are particularly interested
in attacks of the following types.
• Because the network always decides whether or not to enable encryp-
tion, it is possible for a malicious party to act as an intermediary
between a UE and a genuine network, impersonating the network to
the UE and using a genuine SIM of its own to talk to the network. All
traffic sent via the man-in-the-middle is simply relayed. The false net-
work does not enable encryption on the link to the UE, so the fact that
it does not know the encryption key does not matter. If the genuine
network chooses to enable encryption, then the man-in-the-middle can
communicate with it successfully since it is using its own SIM for this
leg of the communications. As a result, the man-in-the-middle can
seamlessly listen to all the voice traffic sent to and from the victim
UE, at the cost of paying for the call.
• The fact that the network decides whether or not to enable data en-
cryption also enables the well known Barkan-Biham-Keller attack, [2].
This attack is designed to recover the encryption key Kc, and hence
enable unlimited interception of phone calls. The attack takes advan-
tage of three key facts: A5/2 is very weak, the network decides which
algorithm to use, and the same keyKc is used with all three encryption
algorithms. One possible scenario for the attack is as follows.
Suppose an eavesdropper intercepts the AKA exchange between the
network and a UE (notably including the RAND), and also some of
the subsequent encrypted voice exchanges involving that UE. Suppose
also that the UE is subsequently switched on within the range of a
fake network operated by the attacker. The fake network inaugurates
the AKA protocol with the UE, and sends the previously intercepted
RAND , causing the SIM in the UE to generate the sameKc as was used
to encrypt the intercepted data. The UE responds with SRES (which
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the fake network ignores) and the fake network now enables encryption
using A5/2. The UE will now send data to the network encrypted
using A5/2 with the key Kc; because of certain details of the GSM
protocol, the plaintext data will contain predictable redundancy. The
fake network now takes advantage of the weakness of A5/2 to recover
Kc from the combination of the ciphertext and known redundancy in
the corresponding plaintext. The key Kc can now be used to decrypt
all the previously intercepted data, which may have been encrypted
using a strong algorithm such as A5/3.
The lack of mutual authentication has been addressed in 3G and later net-
works. As a result it is tempting to suggest that trying to fix GSM is no
longer of relevance. However, GSM continues to be very widely used world-
wide and will continue to be for many years to come; so finding ways of
upgrading GSM post-deployment appears to be worthwhile. However, any
such solution must work with the existing infrastructure, i.e. the existing
serving network systems. We are therefore interested in a solution which
only requires SIMs and the home network to be upgraded. Such a solution
can be rolled out piecemeal with no impact on the existing global infras-
tructure, and this is the focus of the remainder of this paper.
2.4 Proactive SIM
Before proceeding we need to briefly review a key piece of GSM technology
which enables the SIM to send an instruction to the ME. Proactive SIM is
a service operating across the SIM-ME interface that provides a mechanism
for a SIM to initiate an action to be taken by the ME. It forms part of
the SIM application toolkit (STK), which was introduced in the GSM 11.14
technical specification [10]. Communications between an ME and a SIM
are command/response based, and STK provides a set of commands which
allow the SIM to interact and operate with any ME which supports them.
GSM technical specification [12] states that the ME must communicate with
the SIM using either the T=0 or T=1 protocol, specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3
[15]. In both cases the ME is always the master and thus initiates com-
mands to the SIM; as a result there is no mechanism for the SIM to initiate
communications with the ME. This limits the possibility of introducing new
SIM features requiring the support of the ME, as the ME needs to know in
advance what actions it should take. The proactive SIM service provides a
mechanism that allows the SIM to indicate to the ME, using a response to
an ME-issued command, that it has some information to send. The SIM
achieves this by including a special status byte (‘91’ followed by the length
of the instruction to send) in the response application protocol data unit.
The ME is then required to issue the FETCH command to find out what
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the information is [13]. The ME must now execute the SIM-initiated com-
mand and return the result in the TERMINAL RESPONSE command. To
avoid cross-phase compatibility problems, this service is only permitted to
be used between a SIM and an ME that support the STK commands. The
fact that an ME supports specific STK commands is revealed when it sends
the TERMINAL PROFILE command during SIM initialisation.
The SIM can make a variety of requests using the proactive SIM service. Ex-
amples include: requesting the ME to display SIM-provided text, initiating
the establishment of on demand channels, and providing local information
from the ME to the SIM. The commands of interest here are GET CHAN-
NEL STATUS, which requests the ME to return the current status of all
available data channel(s), and CLOSE CHANNEL, which requests the ME
to close the specified data channel. Both of these STK commands are marked
as ‘class e’, which means that an ME that supports ‘class e’ STK commands
is capable of executing both commands of interest [8]. Although support
of STK is optional for an ME, if an ME claims compliance with a specific
GSM release then it is mandatory for the ME to support all functions of
that release. Since 1998 almost all of the mobile phones produced have been
STK enabled, and today every phone on the market supports STK [1].
3 RAND hijacking
We use the term RAND hijacking to refer to the idea of using the RAND,
sent from the network to the UE during AKA, as a way of conveying in-
formation from the AuC to the SIM. That is, instead of generating the
RAND at random, it is generated to contain certain information; this infor-
mation is typically sent in encrypted form so that to an eavesdropper it is
indistinguishable from a random value.
This idea was apparently first described in a patent due to Dupre´ [5]. How-
ever, the use Dupre´ makes of the idea is rather different to that proposed
here. Later, Vodafone introduced the concept of a ‘special RAND’ [23] in
3GPP TSG document S3-030463. As for Dupre´, the purpose of the ‘special
RAND’ was completely different to that proposed here. The other published
references to the notion appear in papers [4, 17, 22] that independently pro-
pose the use of RAND hijacking for improving the privacy properties of
GSM, 3G and 4G networks. As far as the authors are aware, no previ-
ous authors have proposed the use of this technique for providing mutual
authentication in GSM networks.
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4 Server-to-SIM authentication
We now propose a way of using RAND hijacking to enable authentication of
the network to the SIM. For this to operate the SIM must be programmed to
support the scheme, as well as possess certain (modest) additional data, as
detailed below. The AuC of the network issuing the ‘special’ SIM must also
store certain additional data items for each such SIM, and must generate its
RAND values in a special way for such SIMs. No other changes to existing
systems are required.
4.1 Prerequisites
In addition to sharingKi, A3 and A8 (as required for executing the standard
GSM AKA protocol), the SIM and AuC must both be equipped with the
following information and functions:
• functions f1 and f5, where f1 is a MAC function and f5 is a cipher
mask generation function, both capable of generating a 64-bit output;
• a secret key Ka to be used with functions f1 and f5 which should
be distinct from Ki — to minimise memory requirements, Ka and Ki
could, for example, both be derived from a single SIM-specific master
key;
• a 48-bit counter to be used to generate and verify sequence numbers1.
The functions could be precisely the same as their counterparts used in 3G
(UMTS). Indeed, the function names and string lengths have deliberately
been made identical to those used in 3G systems to make implementation
and migration as simple as possible.
4.2 Protocol operation
The novel AKA protocol only differs from the ‘standard’ GSM AKA protocol
(as described in section 2.2 above) in steps 3 and 6. Thus, since these
steps only involve the AuC and SIM, it should be clear that the scheme
is inherently transparent to the serving network and the ME. We describe
below how these steps are changed.
1As in 3G, an AuC might choose to manage a single counter shared by all user accounts
(see, for example, [19]).
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4.3 Revised steps
Step 3 is changed to the following step 3*. To generate a new authentication
triple, the AuC proceeds as follows (see Figure 1(b)).
3.1 The AuC uses its counter value to generate a 48-bit sequence number
SQN, which must be greater than any previously generated value for
this user account.
3.2 A 16-bit value AMF is also generated, which could be set to all zeros,
or could be used for purposes analogous to the AMF value for 3G
networks.
3.3 A 64-bit tag value MAC is generated using function f1, where
MAC = f1Ka(AMF||SQN),
and, as throughout, || denotes concatenation of data items.
3.4 A 64-bit encrypting mask AK is generated using function f5, where
AK = f5Ka(MAC).
3.5 The 128-bit RAND is computed as
RAND = ((AMF||SQN)⊕ AK)||MAC,
where, as throughout, ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive or operation.
3.6 The XRES and Kc values are computed in the standard way, that is
XRES = A3Ki(RAND) and Kc = A8Ki(RAND).
Step 6 is changed to step 6*, as follows (see Figure 1(a)).
6.1 On receipt of the 128-bit RAND value, the SIM first splits it into two
64-bit strings X and MAC*, where X||MAC* = RAND.
6.2 A 64-bit decrypting mask AK* is generated using function f5, where
AK* = f5Ka(MAC*).
6.3 A 16-bit string AMF* and a 48-bit string SQN* are computed as:
AMF*||SQN* = X ⊕ AK*.
6.4 A 64-bit tag XMAC is computed as:
XMAC = f1Ka(AMF*||SQN*).
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Figure 1: Modifications at the SIM and the AuC
6.5 The recovered sequence number SQN* is compared with the SIM’s
stored counter value and XMAC is compared with MAC*:
• if SQN* is greater than the current counter value and XMAC =
MAC*, then:
– the network is deemed to be successfully authenticated;
– the SIM’s counter value is updated to equal SQN*; and
– SRES and Kc are computed as specified in the current step
6;
• if either of the above checks fail then:
– network authentication is deemed to have failed;
– the SIM’s counter value is unchanged; and
– SRES and Kc are set to random values.
It should be clear that, in step 6*, AK*, AMF*, MAC* and SQN* should
respectively equal the AK, AMF, MAC and SQN values originally computed
by the AuC in step 3*.
4.4 Design rationale
The composition of the RAND value in the above scheme has been made
as similar as possible to the 128-bit value AUTN used to provide server-to-
UE authentication in the 3G AKA protocol. This is for two main reasons.
Firstly, as stated above, by adopting this approach it is hoped that imple-
mentation of, and migration to, this new scheme will be made as simple as
possible for network operators. Secondly, the 3G AKA protocol is widely
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trusted to provide authentication, and it is hoped that trust in the novel
scheme will be maximised by adopting the same approach.
The only differences between the 3G AUTN and the above construction of
RAND are relatively minor, and are as follows.
• In 3G, the AK value is computed as a function of the the RAND,
whereas here it is necessarily only computed as a function of the last
64 bits of RAND . However, these last 64 bits are computed as a
function of data which changes for every authentication triple, and
hence the AK should still do an effective job of concealing the content
it is used to mask.
• In 3G the AK is only 48 bits long, and is only used to encrypt (mask)
the SQN . Here we use it to mask the SQN and the AMF, to en-
sure that a ‘new style’ RAND is indistinguishable from an ‘old style’
randomly generated RAND to any party without the key Ka.
• In 3G, the MAC is computed as a function of the RAND, SQN and
AMF, whereas in the above scheme it is computed only as a function of
SQN and AMF, again for obvious reasons. This is the only significant
difference from the perspective of authenticating the network to a UE,
but we argue below in section 6.2 that this change does not affect the
security of the protocol.
The AUTN checking process proposed here and that used in 3G are essen-
tially the same.
One other issue that merits mention is the fact that it is proposed that the
SIM outputs random values if authentication fails. It is necessary for the
SIM to output values of some kind, since this is part of the existing SIM-
ME protocol. That is, placeholder values are required. It is important for
reasons discussed below that the SIM should not output the correct session
key Kc. The only other ‘obvious’ placeholder values would be to use fixed
strings, but the use of random values seems less likely to be obvious if these
values are sent across the network (in the case of the SRES value) or used
for encryption purposes (for Kc). There may be advantages in not revealing
to a casual eavesdropper the fact that authentication has failed.
5 Using the authentication results
In the previous section we showed how the SIM can authenticate the net-
work; that is, as a result of step 6*, the SIM will know whether or not the
RAND genuinely originates from the AuC and is fresh. However, we did
not describe any way for the ME to know whether authentication has failed
10
Figure 2: SIM-ME interactions to drop the established connection
or succeeded — indeed, the ME will not understand the concept, as we are
assuming it is a ‘standard’ GSM device.
We propose that the proactive SIM feature described in section 2.4 be used
to achieve the desired objective. That is, in the event of a network authenti-
cation failure, when sending the SRES and Kc (in this case random) values
back to the ME, the SIM should signal to the phone that it has information
to send. When, as a result, the ME sends the FETCH command to the SIM,
the SIM should respond with the GET CHANNEL STATUS command to
learn about the established channels in the present connection. Upon receiv-
ing the channel information in the TERMINAL RESPONSE command, the
SIM uses the response status byte in its response to request the ME to send
a further FETCH command. Once it receives the FETCH command, the
SIM responds with a CLOSE CHANNEL command, specifying the channel
information it received from the ME in response to its previous CHANNEL
STATUS command. The interactions between a SIM and an ME are sum-
marised in Figure 2. The STK commands issued by the SIM should cause
the phone to drop the connection, and (hopefully) prevent any attempted
use of the SRES or key Kc.
6 Analysis
6.1 Deployment issues
We next consider certain practical issues that may arise when using the
scheme proposed in section 4.3.
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It seems that at least some GSM networks issue authentication triples in
batches (see section 3.3.1.1 of GSM 03.20 [9]), thereby reducing the inter-
network communications overhead. Currently, the order in which GSM au-
thentication triples are used does not matter. However, under the scheme
described above, triples must be used in ascending order of SQN . This
may seem problematic; however, since the requirement to use authentication
datasets in the correct order already applies to the corresponding 5-tuples
used in 3G, serving networks will almost certainly already be equipped to
do this.
In existing GSM networks it is possible, although restricted by the technical
specifications [9], for serving networks to ‘re-use’ authentication triples, i.e.
to send the same RAND value to a UE on multiple occasions. This will
no longer work with the new scheme, since the SIM will detect re-use of a
RAND value. Arguably this is good, since re-use of RAND values is highly
insecure: such behaviour would allow the interceptor of a RAND/SRES pair
to impersonate a valid UE and perhaps steal service at that UE’s expense,
an attack that would be particularly effective in networks not enabling en-
cryption.
Finally note that, in order to fully implement the scheme as described in
section 4, MEs need to support ‘class e’ STK commands, although, as dis-
cussed above, this proportion seems likely to be very high. It is not clear
what proportion of mobile phones in current use support those STK com-
mands.
6.2 Security
We divide our security discussion into three parts: confidentiality and pri-
vacy issues, authentication of network to SIM, and authentication of SIM to
network.
6.2.1 Confidentiality and privacy issues
In ‘standard’ GSM the RAND value is randomly selected, and so does not
reveal anything about the identity of the phone to which it is sent. In the
scheme proposed in section 4.3, the RAND is a function of a SIM-specific
key as well as a potentially SIM-specific SQN value. However, the SQN is
sent encrypted, and, assuming the functions f1 and f5 are well-designed, an
interceptor will not be able to distinguish an intercepted RAND computed
according to the new scheme from a random value. Thus the scheme does
not introduce a new threat to identity confidentiality.
The new scheme does not change the way the data confidentiality key Kc is
generated, so the strength of data confidentiality is not affected.
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6.2.2 Network-to-SIM authentication
The novel protocol for network-to-SIM authentication bears strong similar-
ities to the corresponding protocol for 3G. It also conforms to the one-
pass unilateral authentication mechanism specified in clause 5.1.1 of 9798-4
[14, 16]. All the protocols in this standard have been formally analysed (and
shown to be secure) by Basin, Cremers and Meier [3].
An interesting side observation deriving from the novel scheme is that the
3G and 4G AKA protocols appear to be overly complex. The randomly
generated RAND value sent from the network to the SIM, which is used
to authenticate the response from the SIM to the network, is actually un-
necessary, and the AUTN value could be used in exactly the same way as
the RAND is currently. Whilst such a change is not possible in practice, it
would have avoided the need for the AuC to generate random values and
saved the need to send 16 bytes in the AKA protocol.
It is interesting to speculate why this design redundancy is present. It seems
possible that the network-to-SIM authentication was added as a completely
separate protocol to complement the GSM-type SIM-to-network authenti-
cation mechanism, and no-one thought how the two mechanisms could be
combined and simplified (as in the mechanism we propose).
6.2.3 SIM-to-network authentication
The novel scheme does not affect how the existing SIM-to-network authen-
tication protocol operates, except that a random RAND is replaced by one
which is a cryptographic function of a sequence number. The new-style
RAND remains unpredictable to anyone not equipped with the key Ka, and
is deterministically guaranteed to be non-repeating (a property that only
holds in a probabilistic way for a random RAND). That is, it possesses pre-
cisely the qualities required by the existing protocol, and hence the security
of SIM-to-network authentication is unaffected.
6.3 Impact on known attacks
We conclude our analysis of the protocol by considering how it affects pos-
sible attacks on GSM networks.
6.3.1 Fake network attacks
As discussed in section 2.3, if a phone joins a fake GSM serving network,
then this fake network can send any RAND value it likes as part of the
AKA protocol, and the UE will complete the process successfully. If the
13
network does not enable encryption, then communications between the UE
and the network will work correctly, which could enable the network to act
as an eavesdropping man-in-the-middle by routing calls from the captured
UE via a genuine network. This will no longer be true if the new scheme
is implemented, since the SIM will instruct the ME to drop the connection
when supplied with a non-genuine RAND value.
Of course, it may be possible for a fake network to avoid the AKA proto-
col altogether, and simply start communication with a newly attached UE.
Whether MEs will accept unauthenticated communication is currently not
clear to the authors.
6.3.2 Barkan-Biham-Keller attacks
We next consider a particular type of fake network attack, namely the
Barkan-Biham-Keller attack outlined in section 2.3. As described there,
the attack requires the re-sending of an ‘old’ RAND to a UE. The new
scheme will clearly prevent such an attack, i.e. the Barkan-Biham-Keller
attack will be prevented, at least in most practical scenarios.
7 Relationship to the prior art
This is by no means the first practical proposal for enhancing GSM to in-
corporate mutual authentication. Indeed, the 3G AKA protocol, discussed
widely in this paper, can be regarded as doing exactly that. Although several
3GPP TSG documents [6, 7] proposed the introduction of network authen-
tication into the GSM network, none were adopted, presumably because of
cost/feasibility issues. The Ericsson proposal [7] suggested transferring au-
thentication responsibility to the terminal by implementing the core of the
UMTS AKA protocol entirely in software, which in turn raised other secu-
rity threats. Other proposals have been made, including by Kumar et al.,
[18]. However, all previous proposals are completely impractical in that they
would require replacing all the GSM infrastructure. Such a major change to
an existing very widely deployed scheme is simply not going to happen.
The most similar proposals to that given here are some of the other schemes
using RAND hijacking, summarised in section 3. In particular, van den
Broek, Verdult and de Ruiter [22] propose a similar structure for a hijacked
GSM RAND, in their case including a sequence number, a new temporary
identity for the SIM, and a MAC, all encrypted in an unspecified way. How-
ever, their objective is not to provide authentication of the network to the
SIM, but to provide a way to reliably transport new identities from the AuC
to the SIM.
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8 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a method for enhancing the GSM AKA protocol to pro-
vide authentication of the network to the UE, complementing the UE-to-
network authentication already provided. This provides protection against
some of the most serious threats to the security of GSM networks. This is
achieved in a way which leaves the existing serving network infrastructure
unchanged, and also does not require any changes to existing MEs (mo-
bile phones). That is, unlike previous proposals of this general type, it is
practically realisable.
A number of practical questions remain to be answered, including the pro-
portion of MEs supporting ‘class e’ STK commands, the behaviour of MEs in
networks which never perform the AKA protocol, and whether serving net-
works can be relied upon to use GSM authentication triples in the intended
order. Discovering answers to these questions remains as future work.
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